Jason Garred - Department of Economics, University of Ottawa

      Fields of research - Development economics, international trade



      Winners and Losers from a Commodities-for-Manufactures Trade Boom
        (with Francisco JM Costa and João Paulo Pessoa)
        Journal of International Economics 102 (2016), pp. 50-69
        Nontechnical summary: VoxEU (also published by VoxLACEA and the Lindau meetings blog)
        Online appendix   Concordances and replication files

A recent boom in commodities-for-manufactures trade between China and other developing countries has led to much concern about the losers from rising import competition in manufacturing, but little attention on the winners from growing Chinese demand for commodities. Using census data for Brazil, we find that local labour markets more affected by Chinese import competition experienced slower growth in manufacturing wages between 2000 and 2010. However, we observe faster wage growth in locations benefiting from rising Chinese commodity demand during the same period.

      The Persistence of Trade Policy in China After WTO Accession
        Journal of International Economics 114 (2018), pp. 130-142
        Nontechnical summary: VoxEU
        Online appendix   China export restrictions data   Concordances and replication files

Import tariffs have fallen steeply worldwide over the last several decades, but has trade policy persisted through a rise in the use of other instruments? I study this question in the context of China's 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization, using panel data on Chinese export policies. I find that after its entry into WTO, the distribution of China's export restrictions across industries increasingly resembles the inverse of its pre-WTO import tariff schedule. The evidence suggests that increases in export restrictions are likely to have partly restored China's pre-WTO trade policy.

      On Target? The Incidence of Sanctions Across Listed Firms in Iran
        (with Mirko Draca, Leanne Stickland and Nele Warrinnier)

How successful are sanctions at targeting the economic interests of political elites in affected countries? We study the efficacy of targeting in the case of Iran, using information on the stock exchange-listed assets of two specific political entities with substantial influence over the direction of Iran's nuclear program. Our identification strategy focuses on the process of negotiations for sanctions removal, examining which interests benefit most from news about diplomatic progress. We find that the stock returns of firms owned by targeted political elites respond especially sharply to such news, though other listed firms unconnected to these elites also benefit from progress towards sanctions relief. These results indicate the 'bluntness' of sanctions on Iran, but also provide evidence of their effectiveness in generating economic incentives for elite policymakers to negotiate a deal for sanctions relief.

Current teaching

      ECO3151 - Introduction to Econometrics (undergraduate)
      ECO3551 - Introduction à l'économétrie (undergraduate)
      ECO4117 - Development Economics (undergraduate)
      ECO6170 - Theory of Economic Development (graduate)