Jason Garred - Department of Economics, University of Ottawa

Fields of study

      Major fields: Development economics, international trade
      Minor fields: Applied microeconomics, economics and public policy



      Winners and Losers from a Commodities-for-Manufactures Trade Boom
        (with Francisco JM Costa and João Paulo Pessoa)
        Journal of International Economics 102, pp. 50-69
        Online appendix   Concordances and replication files

A recent boom in commodities-for-manufactures trade between China and other developing countries has led to much concern about the losers from rising import competition in manufacturing, but little attention on the winners from growing Chinese demand for commodities. Using census data for Brazil, we find that local labour markets more affected by Chinese import competition experienced slower growth in manufacturing wages between 2000 and 2010. However, we observe faster wage growth in locations benefiting from rising Chinese commodity demand during the same period.

      The Persistence of Trade Policy in China After WTO Accession
        Revise and resubmit, Journal of International Economics
        China export restrictions data

Import tariffs have fallen steeply worldwide over the last several decades, but has trade policy persisted through a rise in the use of other instruments? I study this question in the context of China's 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization, using panel data on Chinese export policies. I find that after its entry into WTO, the distribution of China's export restrictions across industries increasingly resembles the inverse of its pre-WTO import tariff schedule. The evidence suggests that increases in export restrictions are likely to have partly restored China's pre-WTO pattern of industrial protection.

      On Target? The Incidence of Sanctions Across Listed Firms in Iran
        (with Mirko Draca, Leanne Stickland and Nele Warrinnier)

A central premise of current international sanctions policy is targeting, that is, concentrating the impact of sanctions on specific, politically influential groups in the sanctioned country. However, many economic factors make it difficult for senders of sanctions to hit these targets. We offer evidence on the efficacy of targeting in the case of Iran, where sanctions aimed to affect a well-defined set of political entities through their economic interests. Our identification strategy focuses on the process of negotiations for sanctions removal. We find that stock returns of firms owned by targeted political groups and firms unrelated to these groups both react positively to information indicating progress in diplomatic negotiations. However, these effects are significantly larger for firms owned by targeted groups. This evidence suggests that good news about sanctions relief yielded particularly large economic benefits for targeted political entities, consistent with the 'income targeting' goal of sanctions policy against Iran.

Current teaching

      ECO3151 - Introduction to Econometrics (undergraduate)
      ECO4117 - Development Economics (undergraduate)
      ECO6170 - Theory of Economic Development (graduate)